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R.EsTITUTION-llNJUST ENRicHMENT-RrGHT oF DEFAULTING PuncHASBR
TO R.EcoVBR PART PAYMENTS-Plaintiff made a prepayment of $59,946.67,
or twenty-five percent, on twenty printing presses which it was purchasing
for shipment to Russia. Before their delivery a federal regulation was promulgated under which plaintiff was denied an export license. Plaintiff therefore rejected tender of the presses, and defendant vendor sold them to a
third party for $18,765 more than the contract price to plaintiff. Plaintiff
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sued to recover its down payment and the profit resulting from defendant's
resale. On appeal from a judgment for defendant, held, reversed and remanded. A defaulting purchaser is entitled to restitution of its payments in
excess of damages caused the vendor by the breach, but it is not entitled to
any profits realized by the vendor from resale of the goods. Amtorg Trading
Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., (2d Cir. 1953) 206 F. (2d) 103.
In a legal system opposed to forfeiture and unjust enrichment, the result
of the present case would seem beyond cavil. Nonetheless, the vast majority
of decisions assert without qualification that a defaulting purchaser cannot
recover payments made prior to the default. 1 The facts of the cases seldom
support such a sweeping rule. Much more often than not the purchaser is
attempting to recover an amount which he has agreed to give up under a
reasonable provision for liquidated damages, or which is so small in comparison with the total contract price that it probably does not exceed the
loss caused the vendor by the breach.2 On the other hand, where the purchaser can show that his payments exceed the vendor's injury, numerous
courts allow restitution of the excess.3 Such a result appears completely in
accord with the traditional judicial aversion to forfeitures and penalties.4 At
the same time, the argument against restitution in executory contract cases
seems to rest on little more than a notion which finds its ultimate expression
in one court's contention that to permit a defaulter to take advantage of his
breach "would tend to demoralize the whole country."5 Something of the
same dubious attitude is often exhibited by courts granting restitution, when
they require as a condition for relief that the purchaser's breach must not
be willful or deliberate.6 Rarely is an attempt made to define these terms,
and frequently the question of willfulness is simply ignored.7 Furthermore,
lNeis v. O'Brien, 12 Wash. 358, 41 P. 59 (1895); Dluge v. Whiteson, 292 Pa. 334,
141 A. 230 (1928); 5 CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1129 (1951); 3 WILLISTON, SALEs, rev. ed.,
§599m (1948); 11 A.L.R. (2d) 701 (1950). For cases dealing with land contracts see 59
A.L.R. 189 (1929); 102 A.L.R. 852 (1936); 134 A.L.R. 1064 (1941).
2 Typical is Sandberg v. Rudd-Melikian, Inc., (D.C. Pa. 1951) 100 F. Supp. 967, affd.
(3d Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 192 ($7,500 down on $130,000 worth of machinery). See
cases cited in 5 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1132, nn. 74, 75 (1951); 45 CoL. L. REv. 72 at 76,
77, nn. 29-31, 35 (1945). And note the facts of the cases collected in 11 A.L.R. (2d) 701
(1950).
3 Michigan Yacht & Power Co. v. Busch, (6th Cir. 1906) 143 F. 929; Sabas v. Gregory,
91 Conn. 26, 98 A. 293 (1916); Humphrey v. Sagouspe, 50 Nev. 157, 254 P. 1074
(1927); 5 CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1129, n. 52, §1135 (1951). Accord, with the express
qualification that earnest money may be retained by the vendor: 2 CoNTRAcrs REsTATEMENT §357 (1932); Dies v. British and International Mining and Finance Corp., Ltd.,
[1939] 1 K.B. 724 (1938).
4 E.g., in mortgage law. See Thurston, "Recent Developments in Restitution: 19401947," 45 MicH. L. REv. 935 at 952 (1947); 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., §1476
(1937). Observe also the courts' solicitude about the reasonableness of liquidated damages
provisions. 138 A.L.R. 594 (1942); 6 A.L.R. (2d) 1401 (1949).
·
5 Quoted with approval in Dluge v. Whiteson, note 1 supra, at 335.
6 See Schwasuick v. Blandin, (2d Cir. 1933) 65 F. (2d) 354; 2 CoNTRAcrs REsTATEMENT §357(l)(a) (1932).
7 E.g., Humphrey v. Sagouspe, note 3 supra. In the instant case the court approved
the Restatement's qualification that nonperformance must not be "wilful and deliberate,"
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the condition establishes an illogical scale of "punitive damages" by imposing
the heaviest penalty on the purchaser who performs most of his contract
before defaulting. 8 When these considerations are coupled with the obvious
fact that even the victim of a willful wrongdoer may be unjustly enriched, it
becomes highly doubtful whether qualifications regarding willfulness serve
any valid purpose. 9 Fortunately for defaulting purchasers, even where courts
espouse the supposed majority view denying restitution regardless of the reason
for the breach, a rigorous application of the rule is avoided by resort to such
doctrines as substantial performance, waiver, and implied rescission.10 But
despite this fact, and despite the fact that the rule is usually invoked in cases
where there is in reality no unjust enrichment, the repeated formulation of
such a rule seems unwise. Inevitably some judges will accept the rule at face
value and apply it with devastating results.11 And federal courts in diversity
cases may find it impossible to escape the impact of the stated rule.12 If the
courts do not remedy this situation, it is likely that the legislatures will. Relief
against forfeiture is already provided for defaulting purchasers under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. 13 California has long had a statute affording
general relief in case of forfeiture. 14 Recently New York amended its sales
act to allow a defaulting purchaser restitution of payments in excess of the
amount of a reasonable liquidated damages clause or, in the absence of such
a clause, in excess of twenty percent of the value of the purchaser's obligation

and then merely said that plaintiff was "suddenly caught in the operation of the export
license system." Principal case at 105, 108. Thus a default due to economic hardship may
not be considered willful.
8 See Freedman v. Rector, etc., of St. Matthias Parish, 37 Cal. (2d) 16 at 22, 230 P.
(2d) 629 (1951).
9 S"ee 5 CORBIN, CoNTRACTS §ll23 (1951). Both the Uniform Commercial Code and
the recent amendments to the New York sales act allow restitution to a defaulting purchaser,
without mention of willfulness. A.L.I. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL Co»B §2-718 (1952); 40
N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1953 Cum. Supp.) §145-a. But cf. Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) §3275.
10 See N.Y. LAW RBv. CoMM, REP. 204-209 (1942); Hayt v. Bente!, 164 Cal. 680,
130 P. 432 (1913); Wonder Products, Inc. v. Blake, 330 Mich. 159, 47 N.W. (2d) 61
(1951).
11 Eisner v. Mantell, 95 N.Y.S. (2d) 793 (1950) ($370 down on $748) suggests the
possibilities. See also the state court handling of a prior phase of the present litigation.
Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., N.Y.L.J., Sept. IO, 1948,
p. 403, affd. without opinion 275 App. Div. 748, 88 N.Y.S. (2d) 271 (1949).
12 Consider the struggle of the court in the principal case to rationalize a £nding that
the New York Court of Appeals would have granted restitution despite earlier precedents
to the contrary. Ultimately the court by-passed state law and rested its holding on an "overriding national policy" embodied in the Foreign Aid Appropriation Act of 1949, 62 Stat.
L. 1059, §204 (1948), I U.S.C. Cong. Serv. 744-745 (1948). Principal case at 107-108.
Cf. Clear£eld Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 63 S.Ct. 573 (1943).
1a2 U.L.A. §§19-21, 25 (1922, 1953 Cum. Supp.).
14 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) §3275. This statute was wholly disregarded in
Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. I, 55 P. 713 (1898), but was revitalized
by Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal. (2d) II6, 208 P. (2d) 367 (1949), noted 2 STAN. L. RBv.
235 (1949).
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under the contract.15 The Uniform Sales Act is strangely silent on this
problem.16 However, the proposed Uniform Commercial Code provides that
a part payment of more than twenty percent or $500, whichever is smaller,
will be forfeited only to the extent that it is a reasonable liquidation of damages.17 In the absence of legislation it is up to the courts to repudiate their
careless dicta and adopt a rule consonant with equitable principles. For
the most part, that will be no more than saying what has always been meant

Theodore J. St. Antoine, S.Ed.

1 5 40 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1953 Cum. Supp.) §145-a. This act was not
effective until September 1, 1952, and so was inapplicable in the present case.
16 Decisions and dicta in states having the Uniform Sales Act go both ways. Granting
restitution: Humphrey v. Sagouspe, note 3 supra. Contra, Dluge v. Whiteson, note 1 supra.
17 A.L.I. UN.CI'oRM CoMMI!RCIAL ConE §2-718 (1952).

